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Abstract 
An increasing amount of research findings is showing that higher engagement in 
cognitive tasks alleviates the interference of anxiety and worry on task performance as 
compared to lower task engagement. Yet, it is still not clear which cognitive functions are 
mostly contributing to this relieving effect. To add to the current knowledge, the present 
experimental work investigated the relations between task performance, patterns in pupil 
dilation and increased difficulty in tasks requiring, among others, cognitive maintenance and 
updating functions in induced ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions. In addition, the present 
experiment explored if visual complexity level of stimuli is modulating these relations. Data 
analyses of the response speed, proportion of correct answers and pupillary baseline measures 
revealed statistically significant three-way interactions between the condition (‘worry’, ‘no 
worry’), visual complexity (low, high), and task (n-back, reference-back). The results showed 
lower performance measures in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition in an 
easier n-back task, but this disadvantage was eliminated with increased task difficulty. 
Results of the reference-back task revealed that increased period of mental object 
maintenance may be sufficient to shield from disadvantages in the performance efficiency in 
the ‘worry’ condition. The results also showed that increased visual complexity of stimuli 
interfered with the task performance more in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ 
condition. Pupil dilation data showed higher baseline pupil sizes in the ‘no worry’ condition 
linked with, among others, higher working memory capacity, as compared to smaller pupil 
sizes in the ‘worry’ condition. 
Keywords: worry, working memory, task engagement, pupil dilation. 
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Research in the fields of cognition and anxiety indicates that worrisome thoughts and 
anxious apprehension interact widely with cognitive functioning and is negatively affecting 
performance in cognitive tasks by impairing use of attentional control mechanisms and 
cognitive processing resources (e.g., Fernández-Castillo & Caurcel, 2015; Gustavson & 
Miyake, 2016; Sari, Koster, & Derakshan, 2017). The focus on unfavourable consequences of 
anxiety and worry on cognition is a leading trend in the field (see Maloney, Sattizahn, & 
Beilock, 2014; Moran, 2016 for a review). However, an increasing number of studies suggest 
that increased, as compared to reduced, engagement in certain cognitive tasks can lower 
anxiety and shield task performance from detrimental effects of worry and anxiety (e.g. 
Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Patel et al., 2015; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 2012; Vytal, 
Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). 
The present experimental work is aiming to contribute to the current knowledge 
regarding the relations between cognition and worry by further investigating how specific 
cognitive maintenance and updating functions interact with worry and if increased engagement 
in the tasks requiring these functions is helping to alleviate possible negative effects of worry 
on task performance. In addition, the current experimental work is investigating if increased 
level of visual complexity of stimuli is playing a role in this interplay. Moreover, the novel 
pupil dilation measures are expected to reveal new information contributing to the 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the relations between cognition and worry. Generally, 
pupil size is believed to be influenced by such factors as anxiety and stress (e.g., Kahneman, 
1973, Karatekin et al., 2003) while changes in pupillary measures during task performance are 
linked with the amount of cognitive effort (e.g., Beatty, 1982; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). 
A better understanding of the cognitive processes and the role of perceptual visual 
information that may be affecting the downregulation of adverse effects of worry may have 
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valuable clinical applications and may add to the development of tailored relief techniques for 
patients suffering from pathological worry and generalized anxiety disorder. 
State of the Art 
Attentional Processes and Executive Functioning 
In general, the mechanisms of attention are considered responsible for allocating 
resources to perceptual or cognitive processing and are referred to as the “processes of 
selection and loss” (Remington & Loft, 2015) as well as “a state of focused awareness on a 
subset of the available perceptual information” (Gerrig, Richard, & Zimbardo, 2002). 
Moreover, attentional resources are generally considered to be limited, therefore selection 
and processing of information is believed to occur at the expense of other information (e.g., 
Broadbent, 1958; Lavie, 2004; Pashler, 1998; Treisman, 1964;). 
Attentional processes are known to play an important role in cognition, such as 
working memory and executive functioning. The term executive functioning is defined in 
terms of processes related to goal-directed behaviour. Miyake et al. (2000) indicates three 
distinct subcomponents of executive functioning: inhibition, shifting and updating. Updating 
is defined as the ability to manipulate actively relevant information, including monitoring 
incoming information and revising items currently held in working memory as well as 
replacing no longer relevant information with new items (Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibition 
refers to the ability to inhibit responses when necessary and to protect working memory from 
distractors (Miyake et al., 2000). The shifting function is allocating attention to the task 
demands or stimuli that are currently most relevant (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Miyake et 
al., 2000). 
Another relevant cognitive function for the purposes of the present experimental work 
is ‘maintenance’ - defined as an active representation of an object, sound or object’s location 
in working memory (Baddeley, 2007). Maintenance is considered to interact with executive 
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functioning (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2007). Maintenance can be defined in terms 
of domain specific processes, e.g., short term visual or phonological information storage 
(Badelley, 2007) while executive functioning is believed to be domain general and to manage 
maintenance processes (Martini et al., 2015). 
Worry and Anxiety 
Worry is a defining feature of most anxiety-based disorders, such as different phobias, 
health anxiety or obsessive-compulsive disorders, as well as it is a central component of 
generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Worry is defined as 
“a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” 
(Davey & Wells, 2006, p. 3), including anxious apprehension for future and negative events 
(Barlow, 2002) that involves “a predominance of negatively valenced verbal thought activity” 
and minimal levels of imagery (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998, p. 562; Davey & Wells, 
2006, p 3). Anxiety is a broader concept that incorporates worried thoughts, feelings of 
tension and physical changes (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Research concerning relations between anxiety and cognitive performance has 
focused on both state and trait anxiety (e.g. Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Patel et al., 2015; 
Vytal et al., 2012). Trait anxiety is defined as a personality dimension and refers to a 
tendency to experience worry and negative affect such as fear and anxiety across different 
circumstances (David, 2013, Spielberger, 1983). State anxiety refers to anxiety levels in an 
individual at a particular moment (Spielberger, 1983). State and trait measures of anxiety are 
highly correlated and people who score highly on trait measures of anxiety tend to show more 
state anxiety in different situations (Bishop, 2008).  
Relations between Cognitive Functioning, Worry, and Anxiety 
Most of the theories and research that attempt to explain and investigate the 
interconnection between anxiety, worry and cognitive processing are based on the notion of 
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competition for resources, i.e., worrisome thoughts may use up attentional resources and 
leave fewer resources needed for a task at hand (e.g., Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011; Vytal et al., 2012). One of the most influential theories called Attentional 
Control Theory (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009), states that increased difficulty in cognitive 
tasks requiring central executive function affects performance of individuals suffering from 
anxiety in a negative manner. With increased difficulty, anxious individuals are not able to 
compensate for resources already depleted by anxiety (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). 
According to attentional control theory, anxiety impairs the ability to control information 
processing by actively using central executive function (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007). According to attentional control theory, anxiety impairs two executive 
functions – shifting to new stimuli or new task demands and inhibition of irrelevant stimuli, 
while the executive updating function is not affected by anxiety. The authors argue that 
updating mostly involves temporary storage of information and therefore is mostly concerned 
with memory functions, rather than attentional resources per se (Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2009). 
According to attentional control theory, anxiety does not affect processing of 
visuospatial stimuli and may have minimal adverse effects on the processing of auditory 
stimuli (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). Worry is considered to involve inner verbal activity to 
a much greater extent than visual imagery (Davey & Wells, 2006). The attentional control 
theory states that worrisome thoughts interfere mostly with the allocation of attentional 
resources and not with the so called ‘visual sketchpad’ and ‘phonological loop’ (Baddeley, 
2007; Eysenck et al., 2007). According to Baddeley’s model of working memory (Baddeley, 
2007), the visuospatial sketchpad is responsible for maintenance of visual stimuli in working 
memory, whereas phonological loop is responsible for the storage and rehearsal of auditory 
and verbal stimuli. At least one experimental study (Rapee, 1993) has failed to reveal any 
COGNITION AND WORRY  6 
 
 
 
reliable relation between worry and a working memory task requiring solely the visuospatial 
sketchpad. 
Anxiety and cognitive updating and maintenance functions. Generally speaking, 
research findings examining relations between anxiety, worry and cognitive updating 
function are often contradictory. In contrast to attentional control theory, there is evidence 
suggesting that pathological worry is associated with worse processing capacity in updating 
tasks (e.g., Gustavson & Miyake, 2011, 2016). For instance, Gustavson and Miyake (2016) 
found that trait worry negatively influenced reaction times in tasks requiring participants to 
remove items from working memory, which is a part of the updating function. In this respect, 
Gustavson and Miyake (2016) proposed an extension to ACT that updating functions are not 
immune to the effects of anxiety and worry.   
In addition, a number of studies (e.g. Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Patel et al., 2015; 
Vytal, et al., 2012; Vytal et al., 2013) have shown that state anxiety impairs performance in 
tasks involving the n-back paradigm that is widely believed to measure updating functions 
(Schmiedek et al., 2009). However, this negative effect of anxiety on task performance is 
only seen on easier levels of the n-back tasks (for more detailed information about the n-back 
paradigm, see the section “N-back and Reference-back Paradigms” below). With increased 
difficulty level, decrease in performance caused by state anxiety is alleviated (e.g. Clarke & 
Johnstone, 2013; Vytal et al., 2012). For example, Vytal et al. (2012) showed that the task 
performance was negatively affected by anxiety in verbal 1-back and 2-back tasks, but not 3-
back tasks. They have also shown that in an induced anxiety condition, the level of anxiety 
measured by the magnitude startle reflex significantly decreased as task difficulty increased, 
suggesting that state anxiety was lower with increased task difficulty. In addition, Clarke and 
Johnstone (2013) showed that threat of shock interfered with performance in easier 
visuospatial n-back tasks, but this effect was absent with increased difficulty. Moreover, Patel 
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et al. (2015) showed that reaction times were faster in a threat condition than safe condition 
in verbal 3-back tasks, but did not reliably differ between these conditions for verbal 1-back 
and 2-back tasks, even though accuracy was lower for the 1-back and 2-back tasks in an 
induced anxiety condition.  Likewise, Vytal et al. (2013) found that performance was 
diminished by anxiety in verbal 1-back and 2-back tasks, but did not differ for 3-back tasks. 
The tasks within the n-back paradigm are complex and involve the use of several 
cognitive functions, among others, mental object maintenance (Kane, Conway, Miura, & 
Colflesh, 2007; Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016), therefore it is not clear which cognitive 
functions may be responsible for the positive effects of engagement in more difficult n-back 
tasks during worry and anxiety. An attempt to understand further the relation between state 
anxiety and cognitive maintenance function was made by Balderston et al. (2016). The 
authors investigated effects of anxiety on maintenance function separately from executive 
functions. The results also showed that state anxiety did not reduce task performance in letter 
maintenance tasks, suggesting that only executive functions might be prone to negative 
effects of anxiety. These findings support attentional control theory. Moreover, the results 
showed that increased difficulty in these tasks, in fact diminished state anxiety. Likewise, 
King and Schaefer (2010) showed that emotional startle effect resulted from viewing negative 
pictures was disrupted when participants were introduced with a concurrent maintenance 
task, suggesting that working memory maintenance might reduce negative effect in general. 
Limitations of the Existing Evidence and Scientific Impact of the Present Experimental 
Work 
In the main, experimental work investigating relations between anxiety and executive 
updating used tasks utilizing the n-back paradigm (e.g., Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Patel et 
al., 2015; Vytal, et al., 2012; Vytal et al., 2013). This paradigm is generally thought to 
measure the executive updating function, yet it necessarily involves mental maintenance, the 
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executive inhibition function and may involve different visual and verbal features of stimuli 
(Kane et al., 2007; Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016). Therefore, it is hard to draw any 
direct conclusions about exactly which cognitive functions are responsible for diminishing 
anxiety and its negative effects on task performance and which functions are most negatively 
affected. The current experimental work aims to investigate further relations between worry 
and executive updating and working memory maintenance by both using the n-back paradigm 
and by separating load on the executive updating function from mental object maintenance 
using the reference-back paradigm (Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016). Tasks within this 
paradigm are comparable to the n-back tasks, but at the same time allow for manipulation of 
perceptual load on maintenance function independently of updating function. The results will 
help to clarify if maintenance could be mainly responsible for alleviating effects of task 
engagement in the n-back tasks. Furthermore, pupillometry provides continuous measures of 
both arousal levels and the usage of attentional resources (e.g. Kahneman, 1973), and may 
therefore reveal supplementary information about cognitive processing patterns in both 
‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions during updating and maintenance trials. In addition, 
considering that such a measure does not require any overt responses and can be used to 
collect data in all stages of the n-back and reference-back tasks, it might be particularly 
revealing when attempting to disambiguate maintenance and updating functions. 
Furthermore, the findings of different studies using either visuospatial or verbal 
stimuli when investigating relations between worry, anxiety and cognitive functions tend to 
be blended together to describe more general effects. The current experimental work focuses 
on visuospatial tasks in attempt to explore possible effects of worry on the visual sketchpad 
separately from the phonological loop as much as possible. By adding perceived visual 
complexity of stimuli as one of the experimental manipulations, the current experimental 
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work is the first to explore the possibility that visual properties of stimuli might modulate 
relations between worry, updating, and maintenance functions. 
There is also a lack of experimental work examining how cognitive functioning is 
effected by state worry as compared to studies examining effects of trait worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder on cognitive functioning (e.g., Bishop, 2008; Gustavson, & 
Miyake, 2016). In this respect, the present experiment will contribute to current knowledge 
by utilizing an induced ‘worry’ condition. 
Visual Perceptual Load and Distractor Interference 
Investigation of effects of different levels of perceived visual complexity of stimuli on 
relations between worry, maintenance and updating functions was inspired by Lavie et al.’s 
(2004) load theory of selective attention and cognitive control, and by current theories of 
attention proposing multiple attentional resources (e.g., Pashler, 1998). 
Load Theory (Lavie et al., 2004) states that increasing visual perceptual load 
diminishes distractor interference whereas increased cognitive task difficulty increases the 
interference. Operationally, higher visual perceptual load is defined as an increase in the 
difficulty of visual processing requirements of a task or as an increase in number of items or 
units in a display (Lavie, 1995). According to Lavie et al. (2004), the executive inhibition 
function is affected negatively by increased cognitive task difficulty. Increased difficulty in 
cognitive tasks drains cognitive resources needed for inhibition and, in this way, increases 
distractor interference. In contrast, perceptual visual load shields from distractor interference 
by affecting working memory passively, i.e., by consuming available resources so that there 
is no capacity left for the perception of distractors and distractors are not interfering with the 
task performance (Lavie et al., 2004).  
The load theory has not yet been directly applied in the research domain of anxiety; 
however, considering worrisome thoughts as distractors, increased visual perceptual load may 
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affect the interference of worry during task performance. The experimental research 
investigating application of this theory to emotional distractors (Gupta, Hur, & Lavie 2016; 
Lavie & Fox, 2000; Molloy, Lavie, Chait, & Griffiths, 2015) and mind wandering (Forster & 
Lavie, 2009) gives promising results and unveil the potential that this theory may have in 
relation to worry and anxiety. For example, Forster and Lavie (2009) explored the role of 
visual load in determining susceptibility for distraction from internal task unrelated thoughts 
– mind wandering. They found clear effects showing that higher perceptual visual load, as 
compared to low visual load, diminished mind wandering. In addition, Gupta et al. (2016) 
found that increased perceptual load led to diminished interference of distractors with 
negative emotional valence. Collectively, these results indicate that increased visual 
perceptual load may lessen interference of worrisome thoughts on task performance. 
N-back and Reference-back Paradigms 
Taken together, tasks within the n-back and reference-back paradigms measure 
working memory constructs related to executive updating and maintenance functions as well 
as inhibition and recognition under interference (Kane et al., 2007; Rac-Lubashevsky & 
Kessler, 2016). The use of the reference-back tasks gives an opportunity to separate the 
executive updating function from the maintenance function (Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 
2016). For instance, when carrying out tasks within the n-back paradigm, participants are 
required to decide whether the presented item is the same or different from the one that was 
presented n-trials before and, in addition, to memorize the currently shown stimulus. In 
contrast, tasks within the reference-back paradigm are composed of two types of trials: 
reference trials and comparison trials. Participants are required to update their working 
memory with stimuli presented during the reference trials. During the comparison trials, 
participants are requested to determine if the present stimulus matches the one presented 
during the last reference trial. Between a reference trial and a matching picture, participants 
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are required to maintain stimuli in their working memory to complete this task. Only the 
reference trials require working memory updating whereas comparison trials require 
matching, inhibition and maintenance (Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016). A comparison of 
cognitive functions involved in carrying out the n-back and reference-back tasks are detailed 
in Table A1, Appendix A. 
In summary, the combination of the reference-back and n-back tasks that was chosen 
for the current experiment may reveal if increased maintenance function alone is enough to 
minimize possible effects of worry on task performance and if this function may be 
responsible for alleviating effects of increased difficulty in solely n-back tasks. Moreover, the 
results of performance during both the reference-back tasks and the n-back tasks with stimuli 
of two different visual complexity levels may help to see if visual complexity will change the 
dynamics in the relation between worry and cognition that was found in previous research. 
This information may benefit designs of future experimental works. 
Predicted Results 
The following hypotheses follow on from the experimental work reviewed: 
1) Reaction times will be slower and proportion of correct answers will be lower in 
the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition in the n-back tasks. These differences 
will be more expressed in easier n-back tasks (n-back tasks with level 1 of n, n1) than in more 
difficult n-back tasks (n-back tasks with level 2 of n, n2).  
2) Only minor differences between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions are 
predicted in the reference-back tasks. Increased load on maintenance should shield from 
possible negative effects of the worry induction. In this respect, performance in longer 
maintenance task (r2) should have lesser differences between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ 
conditions than performance in shorter maintenance tasks (r1). 
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3) Increased visual perceptual load will lessen possible differences in task 
performance between the ‘no worry’ and ‘worry’ conditions. 
4) Pupil dilation data will reveal differences in processing demand between the 
‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions indicating higher cognitive effort in the ‘worry’ condition. 
Different pupil dilation patterns during trial types requiring different cognitive functions in 
both n-back and reference-back tasks are predicted. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-two participants between the ages 19 and 43 years (mean 26 years) - took part 
in the experiment. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
were informed not to take part if they were suffering from generalized anxiety disorder or 
were in a distressing life situation. 
Apparatus 
Experimental tasks, instructions and stimuli were presented in a Dell Optiplex 755 
(Dell Inc., Round Rock, Texas) personal computer equipped with a RED 500 (SensoMotoric 
Instruments of Germany (SMI), Teltow, Germany) eye tracking system. Stimulus 
presentation and timing were controlled using PsychoPy v.1.85.1 application (Peirce, 2007). 
Pupil dilation was recorded using SMI iView© X 2.7 software at 500Hz. 
Visual stimuli were presented on a 22-inch Dell video monitor (Dell Inc., Round 
Rock, Texas). Participants were seated 70 centimetres from the video monitor and responded 
using the spacebar key of a mechanical computer keyboard.  Calibration and validation of 
gaze data was conducted prior to each participant’s experimental session and was repeated 
until the deviation scores were below an error of 0.5° both horizontally and vertically. 
 All participants were tested individually in a quiet testing room, and all 
questionnaires were presented on paper and completed using a standard ink pen. 
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Design 
Each participant took part in the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ experimental conditions in 
one experimental session. In both conditions, the participants carried out two series of the n-
back (1-back (n1), 2-back (n2)) and two series of the reference-back (r1, r2) tasks. Stimuli of 
two different levels of perceived visual complexity were presented in each task.  
Participants were presented with fifteen practice trials for each task in the beginning 
of the experiment. The number of trials in each experimental condition is presented in Table 
1 below. 
Table 1.  
The number of trials per participant in each experimental condition for each task. 
                                  Task 
Condition Complexity level N1 N2 R1 R2 
No worry Low complexity 90 90 76 104 
High complexity 90 90 76 104 
Worry Low complexity 90 90 76 104 
High complexity 90 90 76 104 
Total   360 360 304 416 
The sequence of the experimental ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions, an order in 
which the tasks and stimuli of different perceived visual complexity were presented, were 
randomized and assigned for each participant individually. 
Tasks. In the 1-back task, the participants were asked to remember the last picture 
presented while in the 2-back task participants were required to remember a picture presented 
two trials before. In both tasks, the memorized picture needs to be compared with a currently 
shown stimulus. The 1-back and 2-back tasks are illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. An illustration of the 1-back and 2-back tasks. Each stimulus was presented for 2.5 
seconds and a blank grey screen was presented for 0.5 seconds between the stimuli. 
During the reference-back tasks, stimuli in reference trials were presented in a white 
frame. Participants were asked to remember these stimuli and to compare them with all the 
subsequent pictures without any frame (comparison trials). Participants were asked to 
respond when they saw the same picture as the last one in a white frame, just without a white 
frame.  
The difficulty level in the reference-back task was manipulated by increasing the 
period during which participants were required to maintain stimuli features in their working 
memory, i.e. increasing the number of comparison trials between the reference stimulus and 
matching stimulus. During the reference-back tasks with a shorter maintenance period, the 
participants were introduced with three comparison trials before each matching picture, 
resulting in a maintenance period of 9.5 seconds. The longer maintenance period included six 
comparison stimuli between a reference trial and a matching stimulus leading to a 
maintenance period of 18.5 seconds. An illustration of the reference-back task with three 
comparison trials between reference trial and a matching picture is presented in the Figure 2 
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below.
  
Figure 2. An illustration of the reference-back task with three comparison trials between a 
reference trial and a matching stimulus. Each stimulus was presented for 2.5 seconds and a 
blank grey screen was presented for 0.5 seconds between the stimuli. 
To address a possibility that participants could learn the number of comparison trials 
between a reference trial and a matching stimulus in each difficulty level in reference-back 
tasks, and in this respect, respond by counting instead of recognizing, sequences with 
different numbers of comparison trials (from none to nine) were randomly included in both 
the r1 and r2 tasks. These sequences constituted up to twenty-five percent of all the trials. 
Data from these sequences was discarded from the analyses and these sequences were not 
included in the number of trials in Table 1. 
‘Worry’ and ‘no-worry’ conditions. In the beginning of the ‘worry’ condition, the 
participants were asked to identify one personally relevant situation that worries them the 
most in their current everyday life. This method is a commonly used strategy to induce worry 
(e.g. Sari et al., 2016; Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014). The 
participants were given two minutes to write down thoughts related to this topic on a blank 
sheet of paper. The participants were notified that these notes are solely meant to help to 
concentrate on a worrisome topic and that the experimenter will not read or take these notes. 
Before each task was presented, the participants were instructed to think about their chosen 
worrisome topic in a usual manner. During this time, a blank computer screen was shown. 
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After fifteen seconds, the first sequence of tasks started. The sequence of instructions in the 
‘worry’ condition is presented in the Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of a sequence of instructions preceding each task in the ‘worry’ 
condition. 
During the ‘no worry’ condition, instead of thinking about a worrisome topic, 
participants were asked to remember and to think about a leisure activity or a hobby that they 
enjoy doing. The sequence in which instructions before each task were presented mirrored 
exactly the sequence in the ‘worry’ condition. 
Stimuli 
Forty-eight different grayscale geometric patterns were used as stimuli in the present 
experiment. Stimuli were generated by Yağmur, Hubertus and Evan (2016) using a statistical 
space filling algorithm (Shier, 2011; Shier & Bourke, 2013). This algorithm fills the space 
with randomly placed non-overlapping geometric shapes that gradually decrease in size. This 
particular set of stimuli was chosen for the current experimental work, because it provided a 
clear division between the levels of visual complexity and included ratings of perceived 
levels of visual complexity made by thirty participants (Yağmur et al., 2016). 
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Stimuli of two different, relatively distant, levels of perceived visual complexity were 
chosen from the original stimuli set (Yağmur et al., 2016). Geometrical shapes used in the 
current experiment included circles, squares and hexagons. The examples of stimuli of two 
different levels of perceived visual complexity that were used in the current experiment are 
presented in Figure 4 below. A mean distribution of brightness values across the layer of the 
stimuli, a background screen and a screen presented between the stimuli were adjusted and 
equalized to the mean value of 125 cd/m2. Stimuli sets including different geometrical shapes 
were randomly assigned to each participant individually. 
 
Figure 4. An example of stimuli sets of two different perceived complexity levels used in the 
current experiment. 
Procedure 
The participants were invited to come to a laboratory at the university campus. During 
the experiment, the participants were presented with written task instructions on a computer 
screen. The participants had a possibility to ask questions regarding the tasks during the 
learning period or during the breaks between the sessions. The experiment included three 
short breaks in each experimental condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) and one longer break 
between the conditions. Participants were able to decide the length of the brakes. On average, 
the experimental session took one and a half hour, including practice trials and breaks. 
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After carrying out the tasks in each experimental condition, the participants were 
asked to rate their mood using a questionnaire consisting of six items. They were asked to 
indicate how calm, tense, upset, relaxed, content and worried they have felt. Each item was 
rated on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1, indicating “not at all”, to 4, indicating “very 
much”. The questionnaire used in the current experiment is a shortened version of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory’s (STAI) state anxiety scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, 
& Jacobs, 1983; Spielberger, 1989) developed by Marteau and Bekker (1992). This short 
version of the STAI has proven to show a robust relationship with the full twenty-item scale, 
showing correlation r >.90 (Marteau & Bekker, 1992; Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). 
A reliability coefficient for the shortened scale is α =.82. (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). 
After filling in the shortened version of the STAI questionnaire, the participants were 
asked to rate their effort in thinking worrisome thoughts and thinking about an activity that 
they enjoy doing. The scale included two items. The first item asked to indicate how much 
effort participants needed to start to think about an activity or a worry, while the second item 
was asking how much effort participants needed to start to think about it again when asked 
before each task. Items were rated on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1, indicating “not 
at all”, to 4, indicating “very much”. 
Ethical issues. This experimental work was carried out in accordance with the rules 
and regulations laid down by the Ethics Committee for the Swedish Research Council. All 
participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
None of the experimental tasks included any form of deception. The tasks and 
questionnaires that were applied in the current experimental work are widely used in 
psychological research and are not harmful to participants. However, the task to think about a 
personal situation that worries the participants could have possibly led to changes in 
participants’ mood. For this reason, during the recruitment phase, all potential participants 
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were provided with extended information about the experiment, including information that 
they will be asked to remember and to think about a situation that worries them in their 
current everyday lives the most. Potential participants were asked not to participate in the 
experiment if they believed that this task could cost any additional discomfort or distress or if 
they were suffering from generalized anxiety disorder. Each potential participant had an 
opportunity to read more about the experiment and to ask questions during the recruitment 
phase. All participants were informed about an option to withdraw from the experiment at 
any time, without giving any reason. 
Furthermore, after the experimental session, the participants were provided with a full 
disclosure and were able to stay longer and to ask questions about the experiment. In 
addition, they were handed debriefing sheets with extended information about the purposes 
behind the experimental work, contact details of the researcher and information about worry 
and anxiety. Contact details for local health centres helping to deal with psychological issues 
were included in the participant debriefing sheets. 
Data obtained during the experiment was coded numerically and there was no 
possibility to connect it to participants’ names. No other data concerning participants’ 
personal information was maintained. 
Pupil dilation 
To complement behavioural data, pupillary responses were used as one of the 
dependent variables in the current experimental work. Pupil dilation has been shown to 
reflect “cognitive effort” or the “usage of attentional resources” in numerous studies (e.g., 
Beatty, 1982; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). In addition, changes in pupillary sizes have low 
latency with respect to changes in processing demand, i.e., changes in pupil size are observed 
immediately after introducing changes in task demand and therefore this method is thought to 
be a reliable index of cognitive effort both within and across tasks (Beatty, & Lucero-
COGNITION AND WORRY  20 
 
 
 
Wagoner, 2000). Adding pupillary data to behavioural response time and binary choice data 
gives an opportunity to collect outcome data in all stages of a task, regardless of response. 
Moreover, pupillary data may also serve as a validation for worry induction. Tonic (baseline) 
changes in pupil size are associated with emotional arousal, while phasic changes occur due 
to variations in task demands, i.e. the pupil dilates in accordance with cognitive effort 
(Karatekin, Couperus, & Marcus, 2004). In summary, this novel method may provide for 
empirical assessment of differences in processing demand regarding both increased task 
difficulty on maintenance and updating functions in both ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ 
experimental conditions. 
Data Analysis 
Data reduction and pre-processing of pupil data. The collected pupil data was pre-
processed using in-house software written in MATLAB 7.4 (The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, 
MA) as provided by R. Johansson, 2016. To correct for blinks and missing data all samples 
of zero data was discarded, including the 10 preceding samples and the 10 following samples. 
To correct for physiologically implausible values, samples with data below 1 mm or above 9 
mm were also discarded. Linear interpolation was performed to correct the data for such 
exclusions on the basis of the first and last good data point. To reduce high frequency noise, 
the data was filtered using a 10 Hz low-pass filter. To capture changes in pupil diameter 
during a trial, the average pupil diameter of the last 200 ms from the preceding baseline 
screen was subtracted from each sample in each condition. 
Analysis. Data analysis was conducted in five parts. First, following the 
recommendations made by Ratcliff (1993) and Whelan (2008), all reaction times (RT) were 
transformed to response speed (RS) by inversion (1/RT). This method reduces the usual skew 
of RT distributions and reduces effects of slow reaction times, which can thwart subsequent 
analysis (Ratcliff, 1993; Whelan, 2008). Only response data from correct trials were included 
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in the response speed analyses. Then relations between the RS and proportion of correct 
responses were examined to determine if there were any speed-error trade-offs in each 
condition. This was done by standard linear regression of RS on logit P, where logit P is the 
log odds ratio of p - the proportion of correct responses: logit P = loge[p/(1-p)].  
Second, Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Modeling (GLMM) was used to examine 
the binary response data. A binomial distribution and logistic link was applied in the 
analyses. For this analysis, condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’), visual complexity (high, low), 
and task (n1, n2, r1, r2), were entered as fixed effects, dummy coded, along with the 4 
interactions 1) condition and visual complexity, 2) condition and task, 3) visual complexity 
and task, 4) condition, visual complexity and task. Participants were entered with their own 
intercepts as well as by-participant random slopes for condition and task. The overall fit of 
each effect was assessed using p-values obtained by likelihood ratio test of the model with 
the effect, against the same model without the effect.  There were no concerns about the 
assumptions underlying this test because logistic regression does not make many of the key 
assumptions underlying linear mixed effects modeling, such as linearity, normality, and 
homoscedasticity. 
Third, the RS data was examined following the same approach used to analyze the 
binary response data using standard Linear Mixed Effects Modeling (LMM): condition 
(‘worry’, ‘no worry’), visual complexity (high, low), and task (n1, n2, r1, r2), were entered as 
fixed effects, dummy coded, along with the 4 interactions 1) condition and visual complexity, 
2) condition and task, 3) visual complexity and task, 4) condition, visual complexity and task. 
Participants and condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) were entered with their own intercepts. 
Further, inclusion of by-participant random slopes for condition and task resulted in problems 
associated with convergence and failed to improve model fit, as compared to the model 
described. No obvious deviations of linearity, homoscedasticity or normality were found, and 
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p-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests of the model with the effect against the same 
model without the effect. 
Fourth, three separate measures of pupil size were computed 1) average pupil 
diameter of the last 200 milliseconds from the preceding baseline screen, 2) mean pupil size 
deviation from the baseline (calculated by subtracting baseline measures from the pupillary 
diameters recorded during each trial), 3) mean pupil diameter for the fifteen seconds period 
before each task, during which each participant was asked to either generate a worrisome 
thought or think about a leisure activity or a hobby that they enjoy doing. 
Analyses using LMM for the pupillary baseline measures included: condition 
(‘worry’, ‘no worry’), visual complexity (high, low), and task (n1, n2, r1, r2) as fixed effects, 
along with the 4 interactions 1) condition and visual complexity, 2) condition and task, 3) 
visual complexity and task, 4) condition, visual complexity and task. Participants and 
condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) were entered with their own intercepts as random effects; a 
random participant by condition slope was also included in the model.  
LMM analyses were also used to examine pupil size data obtained during fifteen 
seconds’ thought generation task and included condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) as fixed effect. 
Participants and condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) were entered with their own intercepts as 
random effects.  
No obvious deviations of linearity, homoscedasticity or normality were observed, and 
p-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests of the model with the effect against the same 
model without the effect in the analyses of the above mentioned pupil dilation measures. 
All attempts to apply LMM to analysis of the mean pupil dilation deviation from the 
baseline data resulted in problems associated with convergence and were discarded. On these 
grounds mean pupil size deviation from the baseline data was analyzed separately using 
standard within participant’s analysis of variance ANOVA with 4 within participant factors, 
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condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’), visual complexity (high, low), task (n1, n2, r1, r2) and trial 
type. Analyses of the n-back and reference-back tasks were conducted separately due to 
differences in trial types (correct rejection and correct answer in the n-back tasks; reference, 
comparison (correct rejection) and correct answer in the reference-back tasks). 
Fifth, STAI questionnaire data was analyzed using LMM and included condition 
(‘worry’, ‘no worry’) as fixed effect. Participants and condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) were 
entered with their own intercepts as random effects. The same LMM model was applied to 
questionnaire data indicating effort needed to think about a worrisome topic or a leisure 
activity that participants enjoy doing. To meet the assumptions of the test, a logarithmic 
transformation was applied to the questionnaire data, and p-values were obtained by 
likelihood ratio tests of the model with the effect against the same model without the effect. 
All data analysis was conducted using R (R Core Team 2017), together with the 
package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) for linear mixed effects modelling.  
The “bobyqa" optimizer (Powell, 2009) was used in GLMM analysis of the binary response 
data to resolve problems associated with convergence. All other LMM analyses use the 
“bobyqa" optimizer by default. 
Results 
Binary Choice and Response Speed 
Linear regression of the RS on logit P revealed a close relationship between RS and 
logit P, F(1, 14) = 14.99, p<.01, Adjusted R2 = .48. As shown in Figure 5 predicted RS is 
equal to 1.16 + 0.91 (logit P). In this respect, no noticeable speed-error trade-offs were found. 
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Figure 5. Relationship between RS for correct responses and logit P as revealed by standard 
linear regression of RS on logit P. 
The proportion of correct responses for the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions by task, 
and the proportion of correct responses for the high and low visual complexity stimuli by task 
are presented in Figure 6. Likelihood ratio tests of GLMM analysis of the binary response 
data revealed a statistically significant fixed interaction effect of condition, visual 
complexity, and task χ2(3) = 20.14, p < .01. No other fixed effects or fixed interaction terms 
were found to be statistically significant. 
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Figure 6. The proportion of correct responses for the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions by 
task, and the proportion of correct responses for the high and low visual complexity stimuli 
by task. The standard errors bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 7 shows mean RS for correct responses for the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ 
conditions by task, and the proportion of correct responses for the high and low visual 
complexity stimuli by task. In addition, Figure 8 graphically shows differences in the RS 
between the ‘no worry’ and ‘worry’ conditions for each combination of the task and visual 
complexity level. Likelihood ratio tests of LMM analysis of the RS data revealed a 
statistically significant interaction effect of condition, visual complexity, and task χ2(3) = 
9.16, p < .05. No other fixed effects were found to be statistically significant. 
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Figure 7. Mean RS for correct responses for the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions by task, 
and mean RS for correct responses for the high and low visual complexity stimuli by task. 
The standard errors bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 8. Differences in the RS between the ‘no worry’ and ‘worry’ conditions in each task 
and visual complexity level. Positive bars indicate combinations of the task and visual 
complexity levels in which participants were faster in the ‘no worry’ condition than in the 
‘worry’ condition. Negative bars indicate tasks and visual complexity levels in which 
participants were slower in the ‘no worry’ condition than in the ‘worry’ condition. The 
standard errors bars show 95% confidence intervals. Figure is prepared according to Table 
B1, Appendix B. 
 In summary, visual examination of the binary choice data reveals higher accuracy 
level in the ‘no worry’ condition than in the ‘worry’ condition in all tasks except for the n2 
task. The RS data indicate that participants were faster in the ‘no worry’ condition than the 
‘worry’ condition in the n1 task. Participants were generally slower and less accurate with the 
stimuli of high visual complexity than with stimuli of low visual complexity. 
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Pupillary data 
Mean pupil size deviation from the baseline. Figure 9 illustrates mean pupil 
diameter deviation from the baseline during the correct rejection and the correct answer trials 
in the n1 and n2 tasks. Within participants analysis of variance of the mean pupil size 
deviation from the baseline data in the n-back tasks revealed statistically significant fixed 
effects of trial type (correct rejection, correct response), F(1,20) = 44.49, p < .01, and visual 
complexity, F(1,20) = 7.14, p < .05. 
 
Figure 9. Mean pupil diameter deviation from the baseline (in millimeters) during the correct 
rejection and correct answer trials in the n1 and n2 tasks. 
 Figures 10 and 11 illustrate mean pupil diameter deviation from the baseline during 
different trials in the r1 and r2 tasks. Within participants analysis of variance of the mean 
pupil size deviation from the baseline data in the reference-back tasks revealed statistically 
significant fixed effects of trial type (reference, comparison (correct rejection), correct 
response), F(2,40) = 26.54, p < .01, and fixed interaction effects of visual complexity and 
trial type, F(2,40) = 4.76, p < .05, as well as task and trial type F(2,40) = 4.54, p < .05. 
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Figure 10. Mean pupil diameter deviation from the baseline (in millimeters) in the r1 task. 
An outline of the r1 task. 
 
Figure 11. Mean pupil diameter deviation from the baseline (in millimeters) in the r2 task. 
An outline of the r2 task. 
To examine further the differences between separate trial types in both the n-back and 
reference-back tasks, figures illustrating mean pupil diameter deviation from the baseline 
during the full length of trial were aggregated. For more information and visual presentation 
of the changes in mean deviation from the baseline during different types of trials see Figure 
C1, Appendix C. 
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Pupillary baseline measures. Likelihood ratio tests of LMM analysis of pupillary 
baseline data revealed a statistically significant interaction effect of condition, visual 
complexity, and task χ2(3) = 54.2, p < .001. No other fixed effects or fixed interaction terms 
were found to be statistically significant. The baseline pupil sizes in the ‘worry’ and ‘no 
worry’ conditions by task, and the baseline pupil sizes in the high and low visual complexity 
conditions by task are presented in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12. Baseline pupil sizes (in millimeters) in the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions by 
task, and the baseline pupil sizes in the high and low visual complexity conditions by task. 
Mean pupil size measures obtained during the 15 seconds of active thinking about 
either a worrisome topic or a leisure activity that participants enjoy doing showed smaller 
mean pupil diameter in the ‘worry’ condition (M=4.85mm, SD=0.78:) and larger mean pupil 
diameter in the ‘no worry’ condition (M=4.96mm, SD=0.89). However, likelihood ratio tests 
of LMM analysis of these measurements did not reveal a significant fixed effect of condition. 
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In summary, pupil dilation data showed higher deviation from the baseline in the 
‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition and generally smaller pupil diameter 
measures in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition. 
Questionnaire data 
 LMM analysis of the results of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory’s (STAI) state 
anxiety scale and the questionnaire indicating level of effort needed to think about either a 
worrisome topic or a leisure activity showed no statistically significant effect of condition. 
Mean scores indicated higher state anxiety in the ‘worry’ condition (M=14.05, SD=2.17) than 
in the ‘no worry’ condition (M=13.41, SD=1.89). Mean score results of the effort 
questionnaire indicated higher effort in thinking about a worrisome topic (M=4.73, SD=2.56) 
than about a leisure activity (M=3.68, SD=2.68). 
Discussion 
General 
The present experimental work investigated relations between the ‘worry’ and ‘no 
worry’ conditions and increased difficulty in tasks within the n-back and reference-back 
paradigms as well as the role of the level of perceived visual complexity of stimuli in this 
interplay. Analyses of the response speed (RS) and binary choice data revealed significant 
interaction effects between the condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’), task (n1, n2, r1, r2) and the 
level of perceived visual complexity of stimuli (low, high).  
Generally, the RS results were as predicted for the n1 and n2 tasks, showing slower 
RS in the ‘worry’ condition in the n1 task and almost no difference between the conditions in 
the n2 task (Figure 7). A similar pattern followed in the results of the binary choice data, 
showing smaller proportion of correct answers in the ‘worry’ condition in the n1 task and 
even higher proportion of correct answers in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ 
condition in the n2 task (Figure 6). These results are in line with the previous research, 
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showing that worry and anxiety do not interfere or interfere less with performance in more 
difficult n-back tasks (e.g., Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 
2012). Results of the analyses of the RS in the r1 and r2 tasks were also according to the 
predictions prior to the experiment. The RS in the r1 task did not differ between the ‘worry’ 
and ‘no worry’ conditions and the results of the RS in the r2 task showed slightly faster 
reaction times in the ‘worry’ condition (Figure 7).  
Taken together, the RS results of the current experiment suggest smaller differences 
between the ‘no worry’ and ‘worry’ conditions during the tasks requiring longer mental 
object maintenance. This notion holds true for the both task paradigms. When increasing 
difficulty level in the n-back tasks, one of the functions of those demand increases is mental 
object maintenance; therefore, the shift from worse performance in the ‘worry’ condition to 
the equal performance in the both conditions may be related to the maintenance function. 
Moreover, no differences in the RS between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions in the 
reference-back tasks, which require primarily the same cognitive functions as the n-back 
tasks (see Table A1, Appendix A) with only the period of mental object maintenance 
increased, backs the notion that maintenance alone is enough to alleviate the differences 
between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions in the RS. However, the results of the binary 
choice data for the r1 task (Figure 6) showed a substantially lower proportion of correct 
answers in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition, which was opposite to the 
predictions prior to the experiment. This result is showing that performance accuracy suffers 
in the ‘worry’ condition even though the response times in correct trials do not differ from the 
‘no worry’ condition. With increased maintenance period in the r2 task, the difference in the 
accuracy level between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions became substantially smaller. 
This may indicate that possible effects of ‘worry’ on the performance accuracy may also be 
alleviated by increasing time of maintenance. 
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According to attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), maintenance and 
updating are not negatively affected by worry. The lower performance measures in the n1 
tasks and r1 tasks in the ‘worry’ condition in the present experiment may be related to an 
impairment of the executive inhibition function, which is the most prone to the deteriorative 
effects of worry and anxiety as stated by attentional control theory.  
Attentional control theory addresses the effects of anxiety on cognition; however, it 
does not directly undertake the findings of the studies showing alleviating influence of 
increased cognitive load on anxiety. An implication of this theory on the latter effect, 
proposed by Balderston et al. (2016), suggested that engagement of the central executive 
functions should mediate the effect of cognitive load on state anxiety. However, the authors 
found that this reasoning did not hold true and working memory maintenance alone was 
enough to suppress state anxiety and its effects on task performance (Balderston et al., 2016). 
The results of the current experiment are in line with these findings. 
The Role of Visual Complexity 
Statistically significant interaction effects that were found in the RS and binary choice 
data in the current experimental work show the importance of presented visual information in 
the relationship between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions and performance in the n-
back and reference-back tasks. Considering previous research literature, this finding is novel. 
Visual examination of the differences in the RS between the ‘no worry’ and ‘worry’ 
conditions for each combination of the task and visual complexity level (Figure 8) reveals 
that the participants responded faster in the ‘no worry’ condition than in the ‘worry’ condition 
with both low and high visual complexity stimuli in the n1 task. However, this difference was 
substantially larger with the high visual complexity stimuli. Moreover, in the n2 and r1 tasks, 
the participants were faster in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition with the 
low visual complexity stimuli and slower in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ 
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condition with the high visual complexity stimuli. These results indicate that increased visual 
complexity of stimuli had deteriorative consequences on the RS in the ‘worry’ condition, but 
not necessarily in the ‘no worry’ condition. 
These results are opposite to the predictions prior to the experiment. According to 
load theory (Lavie, et al. 2004), increased visual load hinders distractor interference and 
recent research findings showed that increased load might hinder interference of inner 
semantic distractors, e.g., mind wandering (Forster and Lavie, 2009) or negatively valenced 
emotional distractors (Gupta et al., 2016). Considering these findings, it was predicted that 
increased visual load would reduce possible interference of worrisome thoughts by 
supposedly consuming more of the available resources, as stated in load theory (Forster and 
Lavie, 2009). However, this assumption did not prove to hold true in this experimental 
setting. The results of the RS and binary choice data of the current experiment are indicating 
that worry may put extra load on cognitive functions and this additional load might worsen 
the interference of irrelevant visual information during the task performance. These 
assumptions are in line with attentional control theory, stating that inhibition is affected by 
worry and that worry and anxiety is interfering with cognitive processing by causing a shift 
from directing attention based on current task goals and intentional plans (so called ‘top 
down’ attentional processes) to attention allocation based on externally driven factors and 
sensory processing of stimuli properties (so called ‘bottom-up’ attentional processes) 
(Eysenck et al., 2007). This shift is leading to competition for access to limited resources in 
working memory (Eysenck et al., 2007). Following these notions, the RS patterns showing 
negative impact of visual complexity on the RS in the ‘worry’ condition may indicate that 
irrelevant stimuli sensory information depleted attentional resources required for tasks in the 
‘worry’ condition to a greater extent than in the ‘no worry’ condition. On the other hand, 
according to the perceptual load model (Lavie, 1995, 2005; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & 
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Viding, 2004) and Pashler’s uncontrolled serial model (Pashler, 1998), perception of visual 
stimuli proceeds in an automatic and involuntary fashion until all stimuli features are 
processed as long as there are any resources left and regardless if this information is required 
for the task at hand. These notions, combined with the processing efficiency hypothesis 
(Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck, & Derakshan, 2011), stating that worry and anxiety primarily 
affects processing speed, may imply that all stimuli features were processed in both the 
‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions, but the processing of stimuli was slower in the ‘worry’ 
condition. 
Few previous studies investigating relations between anxiety and inhibition of salient 
non-emotional visual distractors showed that trait anxiety, but not state anxiety, was related 
to increased visually salient and emotionally neutral distractor interference (Moran & Moser, 
2015) and that state anxiety increased in presence of irrelevant non-emotional distractors in 
individuals already scoring high in trait anxiety (Moser, Moran, & Leber, 2015). In respect to 
these findings, the current experimental work added that state worry might also increase the 
interference of irrelevant visual information. 
Interestingly, in the ‘no worry’ condition, in the n2 and r1 tasks, the RS was slightly 
faster to high visual complexity stimuli than to low visual complexity stimuli (Table B1, 
Appendix B). Keeping in mind that the tasks within the n-back and reference-back paradigms 
require active inhibition function, increased visual load might have had a positive effect on 
distractor inhibition in the ‘no worry’ condition as stated in the load theory (Lavie, 1995). In 
addition, with increased maintenance period in the r2 task in the ‘worry’ condition, visual 
complexity of stimuli did not interfere with the task performance; instead, the RS was higher 
than with low visual complexity stimuli. However, neither of the latter connections can be 
tested further in this experimental setting and more research investigating these relations 
separately is needed. 
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Pupil dilation 
Analyses of the the pupillary baseline measures revealed significant interaction effects 
between the condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’), task (n1, n2, r1, r2) and the level of perceived 
visual complexity of stimuli (low, high). Analyses of the pupil size deviation from the 
baseline in the n-back tasks revealed significant main effects of trial type (correct rejection, 
correct response) and visual complexity (low, high). The analyses of the pupil size deviation 
from the baseline measures in the reference-back tasks revealed statistically significant main 
effect of trial type (reference, comparison (correct rejection), and correct response) and 
interaction effects of visual complexity (low, high) and trial type as well as task (r1, r2) and 
trial type. 
Changes in pupillary baseline measures (so called ‘tonic’ changes) are believed to be 
influenced by general factors, such as anxiety, stress or level of physiological arousal 
(Kahneman, 1973, Karatekin et al., 2003). Generally, larger tonic pupillary sizes are 
associated with wakefulness and activation (Van Der Meer et al., 2010) and were found to 
reflect higher working memory capacity (Heitz et al., 2008; Van Der Meer et al., 2010) in 
comparison to smaller pupil sizes that are more associated with fatigue and drowsiness (e.g., 
Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Morad, Lemberg, Yofe, & Dagan, 2000). In 
the current experimental work, the results of the pupillary baseline measures (Figure 12) and 
the measures that were obtained during the active thinking task, in which participants were 
asked to think either about a worrisome topic or a leisure activity, showed smaller pupillary 
sizes in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition.  
Overall, the pupillary baseline measures peaked in the n2 task possibly showing a 
shift to higher task engagement. The difference between the baseline measures in the ‘worry’ 
and ‘no worry’ conditions is smaller in the n2 tasks than in the n1 tasks. Considering the 
reference-back tasks, the difference in the baseline measures between the ‘worry’ and ‘no 
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worry’ conditions is smaller in the r2 task than in the r1 task. The same patterns are observed 
in the results of the RS and binary choice data mainly relating relatively smaller baseline 
pupillary sizes to lower performance data. 
Pupillary deviation from the baseline measures during task performance that are 
evoked by task demands (so called ‘phasic’ changes) are believed to reflect cognitive effort 
(Beatty, 1982; Kahneman, 1973, Karatekin et al., 2003). In the present experiment, higher 
measures of the pupil size deviation from the baseline were observed in the ‘worry’ condition 
as compared to the ‘no worry’ condition (Figures 9, 10, 11, C1, Appendix C); however, the 
statistical analyses did not show a main significant effect of condition or significant 
interaction terms that included condition in the analyses of the mean pupil size deviation from 
the baseline measures. As the case may be, several processes and factors might be 
contributing to the pupillary changes in the present experimental work and therefore the 
average measures over the entire trial time that were used in the statistical analyses in the 
current experiment may have purged possible effects related specifically to worry. A different 
and more sensitive approach analyzing the temporal unfolding of the pupil signal (Wierda, 
van Rijn, Taatgen, & Martens, 2012) may have given more accurate results and be more 
adequate to employ for the purposes of the current experimental work. As visual examination 
of the morphology of the pupil dilation curves in each type of trial reveals (Figure C1, 
Appendix C), separate patterns and influences are seen during different trial time intervals. It 
is likely that the analysis of temporal unfolding of the pupil signal would reveal more 
information regarding the effects and interaction terms that include the ‘worry’ and ‘no 
worry’ conditions (Wierda, van Rijn, Taatgen, & Martens, 2012).  However, the temporal 
unfolding analysis of the pupillary data was outside the scope of the current thesis work. 
Results of the pupil size deviation from the baseline in a fairly similar study 
conducted by Clarke and Johnstone (2013), that investigated the effects of state anxiety on 
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performance of the n-back tasks, showed that increased difficulty in the n-back tasks resulted 
in a greater cognitive effort in an induced ‘threat’ condition than in a ‘no threat’ condition 
indicated by higher pupil size deviation from the baseline. As visual examination of the pupil 
size deviation from the baseline in the n-back tasks in the current experiment reveals (Figure 
9), similar, although not significant, patterns with greater differences in pupillary deviation 
from the baseline between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions in the n2 task than in the n1 
task were obtained. These differences may suggest that more cognitive effort was employed 
when carrying out the n2 task in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no worry’ condition and 
this higher task engagement could have possibly contributed in relieving the disadvantage in 
the RS and accuracy measures in the ‘worry’ condition during the n2 task as compared to the 
n1 task. The same pattern was seen in the r1 task also resulting in lesser difference in 
performance between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions.  
On the other hand, mean pupil size deviation from the baseline patterns between the 
tasks in the current experiment may also be related to the task difficulty level. An increase in 
pupil size due to task demands was found to be most expressed in moderate difficulty tasks, 
not well apparent in easier tasks that are considerably below resource limits and generally 
decreasing in too difficult tasks in cases where task demands exceed available resources 
(Granholm, Asarnow, Sarkin, & Dykes, 1996). Smaller differences between the conditions in 
the n1 and r2 tasks may be related to lower demands that were put by these tasks. As the 
results of the binary choice data reflect (Figure 6), the proportion of correct answers was 
relatively high in the n1and r2 tasks as compared to n2 and r1 tasks indicating that these tasks 
were not too demanding. This may be one of possible reasons why the results of mean pupil 
size deviation from the baseline did not reveal statistically significant interaction effect of the 
condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’) and increased task difficulty that was found by Clarke and 
Johnstone (2013) using more difficult n-back tasks (2-back and 3-back). 
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In general, the pattern showing decreased pupil size baseline measures and increased 
pupil size deviation from the baseline measures that emerged in the ‘worry’ condition in the 
current experimental work can be linked with an exploitative behavioural profile (Gilzenrat et 
al., 2010). This behavioural profile encompasses narrower focus, exploitation of familiar 
behavioural patterns as well as avoiding exploration outside a current task (Jonathan, Samuel, 
& Angela, 2007). Exploitative state of mind may be associated with better task performance 
caused by narrower focus; however, it is also associated with drowsiness and other low-
arousal states (e.g., Gilzenrat et al., 2010). Concerning the current experiment, this 
behavioural profile could possibly be related to narrower focus on internal phenomena, such 
as worrisome thoughts rather than the current task and therefore not resulting in improved 
performance in all the tasks. However, with increased deviation from the baseline measures 
the task performance seemed to improve in the ‘worry’ condition as well. In contrast to the 
exploitative behavioural profile, larger pupillary baseline measures and smaller deviation 
from the baseline measures as obtained in the ‘no worry’ condition in the current experiment 
has been linked with an explorative behavioural profile involving willingness to take risks 
and search for alternative behaviours (Jonathan, Samuel, & Angela, 2007; Gary Aston-Jones, 
& Cohen, 2005). 
Regarding the role of the maintenance function and the involvement of the central 
executive updating function during the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions, visual examination 
of the mean pupil size deviation from the baseline data for each trial type requiring different 
set of cognitive functions in the n-back and reference-back tasks (Figure C1, Appendix C) 
indicates that there may be possible differences. However, the statistical analyses of the pupil 
dilation data averaged over whole trial epoch did not reveal significant results and, as 
mentioned before, a different and more sensitive approach is needed to employ for further 
examination. Concerning the possible role of the visual complexity of stimuli, it is difficult to 
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estimate how the visual stimuli themselves actually affected the pupil dilation data even if the 
overall luminance was controlled for. There was variability within the stimuli that may have 
mostly differed over the two levels of visual complexity; therefore, no direct conclusions 
regarding the differences in cognitive effort required to process stimuli of lower and higher 
visual complexity can be drawn from the pupillary data obtained in the current experiment. 
In general, mean pupillary baseline measures and mean pupil size deviation from the 
baseline measures indicate differences between the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions. 
However, it is not clear, if the baseline measures reflect exactly induced worry or if the 
thought generation task in the ‘no worry’ condition asking participants to think about an 
activity that they enjoy doing was causing relatively larger pupillary baseline sizes. Yet, the 
baseline patterns combined with the mean pupil size deviation from the baseline patterns, and 
the RS data showing results that are in line with previous studies using different anxiety 
inducing paradigms (e.g., Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 
2012), provide a more reliable support that the worry induction paradigm used in this 
experimental work had an intended effect. 
Conclusion 
The results of the current experimental work showed a greater disadvantage in the RS 
and the proportion of correct responses in an induced ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no 
worry’ condition during easier n-back task than during more difficult n-back task. This 
dynamic indicates that higher task engagement may possibly shield from the detrimental 
effects of worry on task performance. In addition, the use of the combination of the 
comparable n-back and reference-back paradigms in the current experimental work indicated 
that maintenance function might be mainly responsible for the alleviating effects of increased 
task difficulty in the n-back tasks during worry. 
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Moreover, the present experimental work revealed that visual complexity of stimuli 
has an important role when investigating the relations between worry and different cognitive 
processes. The findings of the present experiment show greater interference of more complex 
visual information during the task performance in the ‘worry’ condition than in the ‘no 
worry’ condition. 
Pupil baseline data obtained in the current experiment indicated differences between 
the ‘worry’ and ‘no worry’ conditions showing higher baseline pupil sizes in the ‘no worry’ 
condition associated with, among others, higher working memory capacity (Heitz et al., 
2008) as compared to smaller pupil sizes in the ‘worry’ condition. Visual examination of the 
pupillary data also revealed patterns associated with narrower focus and exploitation of 
familiar behaviours in the ‘worry’ condition and patterns associated with explorative state of 
mind, encompassing greater willingness to take risks and search for alternative behaviours, in 
the ‘no worry’ condition. 
Limitations, Future Directions and Practical Application 
 Due to limited time resources, the current experimental work used repeated measures 
design with two conditions (‘worry’ and ‘no worry’) in one experimental session. These two 
conditions may possibly have had carry over effects on one another. In addition, the ‘no 
worry’ condition cannot be considered ‘neutral’, and therefore no direct conclusions about 
the possible effects of the ‘worry’ condition can be drawn. The other major limitation of the 
current experiment is the utilization of an excessive number of unique combinations of 
condition (‘worry’, ‘no worry’), task (n1,n2,r1,r2) and visual complexity level (low, high). 
This large number of conditions did put constraints on the statistical analyses.  
Furthermore, the current experiment used two levels of difficulty in the n-back tasks, 
1-back and 2-back. However, some previous studies indicate that the 3-back tasks may be a 
threshold for shielding from negative effects of worry and anxiety (e.g., Vytal et al., 2012; 
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Clarke & Johnstone, 2013); therefore, using more difficult n-back tasks could have possibly 
revealed clearer effects.  
Regarding the analyses of the pupil dilation data, including only the average changes 
over the full length of trial might not been a method sensitive enough to capture possible 
effects. A more advanced analysis of the full temporal profiles might be needed. However, 
this was outside the scope of the present thesis work. 
 Notwithstanding the limitations, the results of the current experiment revealed 
findings that can build grounds for future research. The novel finding considering the 
interaction of visual complexity of stimuli and increased difficulty in tasks during the ‘worry’ 
and ‘no worry’ conditions could encourage future researchers to consider visual qualities of 
stimuli when designing experiments investigating effects of worry and anxiety on different 
cognitive functions. Moreover, this finding could inspire more research concerning the shift 
of allocation of attentional resources from willful and planned attentional guidance to 
increased processing and interference of perceptual information caused by a change in 
person’s internal state. By investigating the level of distraction caused by visual information 
during worry and distress, the research in this direction could have practical application not 
only in the fields of anxiety, but also, among others, driving and piloting. 
 Furthermore, more research is needed to investigate what more precise cognitive 
functions may be prone to the negative effects of worry and what functions, by higher task 
engagement, can alleviate these effects. The current research did investigate the updating and 
maintenance functions by using the combination of the n-back and reference-back paradigms; 
however, the executive inhibition function was not separated from the other functions in these 
tasks and was always involved during the correct rejection trials. More research concretely 
separating and investigating the interactions of worry and different sub-functions of the 
central executive as well as mental object maintenance is eminently needed. Furthermore, it 
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is not clear if longer periods of higher task engagement would still alleviate the deteriorative 
effects of worry and anxiety on task performance or if, after a certain amount of time, anxiety 
and worry would start to interrupt with the task performance possibly because of higher 
fatigue in anxious individuals. In this respect, more research including different difficulty 
levels of tasks and investigating different periods of task engagement is needed.  
More knowledge about the easing effects of engagement of different cognitive 
functions during worry and anxiety and information about the period of this engagement 
during which the best results are obtained could be beneficial in development of different 
cognitive behavioral therapy techniques as well as in designing computer applications and 
games that could possibly help to alleviate feelings anxiety and interference of worry. 
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Appendix A 
Comparison of the N-back and Reference-back Paradigms 
A comparison of cognitive functions required to carry out tasks within the n-back and 
reference-back paradigms is presented in Table A1, overleaf.  
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Table A1.  
Comparison of n-back and reference-back paradigms. Prepared according to Ecker, Lewandowsky, Oberauer and Chee (2010) and Rac-
Lubashevsky and Kessler (2016). 
 
Function 
 
 
Description 
 
 
N-back 
 
 
Reference-back 
 
Conclusion 
 
Updating Encoding new items to working memory All the trials Reference trials Controlled and can be manipulated 
separately from other functions in the 
reference-back tasks 
Binding new items to their position 
within the set of items held in working 
memory 
All the trials Not required Binding the new item to its position is 
required only in the n-back tasks 
Removing outdated information from 
positions that are no-longer relevant 
(items that appeared more than n trials 
ago) 
Relevant trials from n-one to 
n-two 
Reference trials Removing no longer relevant items is 
required in the both tasks. In the 
reference-back task this function is 
required during the  reference trials 
Matching Comparing the new item to the one that 
appeared n trials before 
Matching should always 
refer to the stimulus that 
appeared n-trials before 
Matching should refer to 
the most recent reference 
trial 
Operation is the same in the both tasks 
Inhibition Inhibiting irrelevant distraction during 
the comparison process (including both 
internal and external distractors) 
All irrelevant trials All irrelevant trials Operation is the same in the both tasks 
Maintenance Holding information in a stable manner, 
impenetrable to irrelevant distraction 
from the environment 
Time span from n-one to n-
two 
Time span between 
reference and match 
Controlled and can be manipulated in the 
reference-back tasks to a greater extent 
and in isolation from updating functions 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics of the Binary Choice and RS Data 
Mean reaction speed scores, standard deviation and the number of trials for each task, 
condition and visual complexity level are presented in Table B1 below. 
Table B1 
Mean reaction speed scores, standard deviation and the number of trials for each task, 
condition and visual complexity level. 
  
  
 
N1 
 
N2 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
    N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD 
No 
worry 
Low 
complexity 331 1.63 0.53 278 1.28 0.51 191 1.50 0.52 127 1.48 0.53 
High 
complexity 350 1.61 0.49 293 1.29 0.50 212 1.53 0.54 138 1.37 0.49 
Worry Low 
complexity 332 1.61 0.53 311 1.31 0.49 196 1.54 0.50 146 1.44 0.49 
High 
complexity 335 1.51 0.48 299 1.26 0.44 169 1.48 0.48 124 1.48 0.38 
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Appendix C 
Pupil Size Mean Deviation from the Baseline during Each Trial Type 
Figure C1 below shows mean pupil size deviation from the baseline for each trial type in the 
reference-back and n-back tasks. 
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Figure C1. Mean pupil size deviation from the baseline (in millimetres) averaged over all 
participants during different types of trials in n1, n2, r1 and r2 tasks: a) correct rejection trials 
(CR) in n1 task; b) correct response trials (Hits) in n1 task; c) correct rejection trials (CR) in 
n2 task, d) correct response trials (Hits) in n2 task; e) reference trials (Ref) in r1 task; f) 
reference trials (Ref) in r2 task; g) correct rejection trials (CR) in r1 task; h) correct rejection 
trials (CR) in n2 task; i) correct response trials (Hits) in r1 task; j) correct response trials 
(Hits) in r2 task. 
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